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or satisfactory. The subject still remains largely in suspense, and still awaits a definitive solution. At all events, such a solution certainly is not found in this volume.

F. W. TAUSSIG.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

Traité d'Économie Sociale, ou l'Économie Politique coordonnée au Point de Vue du Progrès. Par A. OTT. Deuxième édition, entièrement refondue et mise au courant. Paris, Librairie Fischbacher, 1892. — 2 vols., 1012 pp.

It is very difficult to give an adequate conception of the pretensions of this cyclopædic work. It is an interesting mixture of economics, ethics, theology and history. First of all we are told: "Economic science has not then simply to state laws and facts; it has above all to solve problems. Hence it is not enough for it to state *what is*, but it must also teach us *what ought to be*, and how *what is* may become *what ought to be*." It is this which the English school of economists have failed to understand. Moreover, "social and individual preservation, the realization of liberty and equality, are not simply scientific opinions, left to individual acceptance; they are moral duties, imposed upon humanity by a will superior to its own."

Economics, ethics and religion, thus bound together in indissoluble hierarchy, have found more and more perfect expression in the industrial and social institutions of successive historical epochs. Christianity has now presented to humanity the final goal of its efforts,—"fraternity of all men and all peoples, under the laws of liberty and equality." This ideal, having already transformed the political and civil constitution of modern nations, is now to be realized in the economic order. Upon society rests the responsibility of choosing either the way of peace and order or that of violence and revolution.

Social economy, then, is "the science which aims to organize labor with a view to the highest welfare of society and of the individual and the realization of liberty and equality." Obviously such a science will not proceed in the beaten track of economic inquiry. Moral considerations will come before material. "Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness and all these things shall be added unto you," supplants the materialistic postulates of the classic economics. Instead of the conventional division into production and distribution, we shall ask: What are the occupations and products necessary or useful for social and individual welfare and

the attainment of liberty and equality? What methods and conditions of labor are most appropriate to this end? How ought labor to be distributed among individuals, with a view to liberty and equality? How ought the instruments of labor to be distributed from the same point of view? What is the best general method of distributing products? How ought the product to be applied to social welfare? How ought individual welfare to be secured? The answers to these seven questions constitute the seven books of Part I and occupy a large part of both volumes. Four other questions suggested by the relation of economic facts to the social phenomena furnish the titles of the four brief chapters constituting Part II, at the end of the second volume: Inventions, International Trade, Laws of Population, Charity.

An examination of the present industrial order in the light of these questions, leads to an indictment which enumerates nearly all the familiar charges brought against society by classic, radical or socialistic critics. There is nothing original in this indictment and it need not detain us. The conclusion is that all the evils indicated flow from two fundamental causes: (1) the laws which regulate the distribution of the instruments of labor; (2) the absolute freedom and the absence of all prevision in production and exchange. Two great problems, therefore, present themselves: first, to destroy the inequality which exists in our economic order, so that demand will correspond to real need; and second, to establish prevision and order in production—that is, to proportion production to demand. These two problems comprehend the whole of social economy.

The remedy proposed is association, which, "by giving the instrument of labor to the laborer in proportion as he is a laborer, will destroy at a blow all the deplorable effects which result from the existing distribution." It will liberate the workman, rescue him from his inferiority, give him the entire fruit of his labor, and enable him to take his part in the production of things agreeable and useful. It will secure for all liberty in the choice of occupation. It will transform demand, and consequently the distribution of labor and of production in general. At the same time it will correct some of the disorders born of unlimited competition,—by making trade and production more regular, by banishing speculation, by assuring a market.

The obvious objection to this solution is that association—productive coöperation and all the rest—has been tried and found wanting. The failure is admitted by the author, who ascribes it to lack of moral

sentiment among laborers, and to the opposition of the "all or none" type of socialist or collectivist reformers. Moreover,

it is beyond doubt that association presupposes moral conditions superior to those demanded by individual labor; a man needs more morality, more intelligence, a higher conception of duties, to work harmoniously with others, than to work by himself. Unhappily it is also certain that the majority of workingmen are far below this moral plane. But provided a minority of them—and even a small minority—have reached it, it is enough.

The friends of association are therefore called upon to gird up their loins. State discriminations in favor of association are justified; but state loans are not needed. On the other hand, private benefactions for the encouragement of coöperation, such as that left by M. Rampal to be administered by the municipality of Paris, are to be encouraged. Legislative restrictions upon freedom of organization should be removed; government contracts should be open to bids from such associations; there must be no limit as to membership; all employees must be included; profits must not be distributed on capital. Without these precautions coöoperators will inevitably become "employers" and revert to the capitalist organization they start to cure. Profit-sharing is a step in the right direction. It is welcomed for its own sake as an ameliorating agent; but especially as a transition to workingmen's associations.

Besides "association," the author demands, as complementary and partly transitional measures, the organization of credit; modification of the law of inheritance; a minimum rate of wages; fixed rents; a reform of our system of taxation, notably by the creation of a progressive income tax; institutions of *prévoyance* connected with institutions of credit; trade unions; the organization of technical education; and repressive measures against excessive competition.

Such a treatise has an obvious interest as illustrating a method of approaching the problems of social economics. It presents all the elements of strength and of weakness. There is something hopeful in the mental attitude which recognizes the necessity of prefacing each new phase of a discussion with a segment of universal history, running from that portion of the ever-widening periphery of social phenomena known as the "present state of the problem," back to that limbo-center of all things, primitive society. But these pie-shaped segments of universal history make enormous demands upon the digestion of the critical reader and almost equally exorbitant claims upon the purely receptive student's confidence in the omniscience and impartiality of the author. Indeed, the suspicion fre-

quently suggests itself that these historical prefaces are to be regarded not as light thrown upon obscure problems by research, but as the historical shadow which reconstructive theories are apt to project into the past.

EDWARD CUMMINGS.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

The Lowell Lectures on the Ascent of Man. By HENRY DRUMMOND, LL.D. New York, James Pott & Co., 1894.—xi, 346 pp.

The fundamental fallacy of Kidd's *Social Evolution* lies in the assumption that all acts not purely selfish are "ultra-rational," or in other words, irrational. In *The Ascent of Man* it is shown that altruism is neither irrational nor supernatural, but is a necessary factor in the development of society and is capable of scientific explanation. The thought is not altogether new, but it has never before been so thoroughly well demonstrated.

It is almost axiomatic that society could not exist without altruism. Even the simplest forms of coöperation or mutual aid would be impossible, unless the individuals concerned had some regard for each other. Association presupposes some degree of unselfishness. But if altruism is a necessary social function, it should be possible to explain its origin and development by natural causes, just as the biologist explains the development of an organ by showing the necessity for its use. And so Professor Drummond explains the growth of altruism as a part of the process of evolution, conforming to the law of the survival of the fittest. He finds the origin of altruistic feeling in maternity, and shows that the devotion and rudimentary self-sacrifice of both primitive parents must have been favorable to the survival of their offspring. Thus altruism, or "the struggle for the life of others," arose necessarily out of the function of reproduction; and, beginning in the family, it gradually extended to embrace members of the clan, the tribe, the nation, the human race.

Professor Drummond contends that the "struggle for life" has been over-emphasized, at the expense of the other factor in evolution — the "struggle for the life of others." He says:

The first step in the reconstruction of sociology will be to escape from the shadow of Darwinism — or rather, to complement the Darwinian formula of the struggle for life by a second factor which will turn its darkness into light.

The Ascent of Man would be significant as an answer to *Social Evolution*, even if it contained no reference to Mr. Kidd's peculiar